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NOTES
MORTGAGEE'S RIGHT TO RENT AFTER DEFAULT-From the standpoint of

mortgagees in Pennsylvania, the recent decision of the Superior Court in Bulger
v. Wilderman '- is one of the most important in recent years. In that case,2
the plaintiff was tenant under a lease made subsequent to the mortgage. The
mortgage being in default, the mortgagee notified the plaintiff that it had taken
possession of the premises, and demanded that the rent be paid to him. The
plaintiff complied with the demand, and set up this payment as a defense to an
action for the rent by the mortgagor. The court held the defense valid, and gave
judgment for the plaintiff in an action of replevin to recover certain goods distrained by the mortgagor. Judge Keller, the writer of the opinion, is very careful
in limiting precisely the question at issue,3 and it is to his credit that the case contains so little of misleading dicta, a virtue that cannot be ascribed to many Pennsylvania mortgage cases of the nineteenth century. The actual point decided,
although one of first instance in Pennsylvania, 4 is not without precedent in other
jurisdictions; the cases uniformly hold that the tenant does not have to pay
twice.3 There never was much doubt but that the mortgagee was entitled to the
Left undecided, howrent, if he could succeed in getting the tenant to pay him.
ever, are questions of perhaps greater importance. Can the mortgagee compel the
tenant to pay him, and upon a refusal, distrain for the rent? 6 Is the situation any
different where the lease precedes the mortgage? These questions have come up
in the courts of other jurisdictions, and it may be profitable to inquire into the
existing state of the law. At any rate, as far as Pennsylvania is concerned,
io1 Pa. Super. 168 (1931).
'The facts given in the text are sufficient to describe ihe legal situation. There were
several assignments in the actual case, but they do not alter the problem.
"The question at issue in this appeal is not whether insurance company (mortgagee)
could have sued this plaintiff (tenant), or distrained his property, for the rent, following a
notice of breach of the mortgage and demand for rent, . . . but whether following such
notice and demand after condition broken, a payment of the rent by plaintiff to insurance company is a good defense to the demand for the same rent by the defendant (mortgagor) ... "
supra note I, at 179.
"There are two lower court cases in which the mortgagee sought some remedy after default and, pending foreclosure. In Himber v. Kraft, 2o Del. Co. Rep. 591 (1930), Judge
Fronefield refused to grant to the mortgagee a preliminary injunction restraining the mortgagor from collecting rents from the various tenants. The mortgage was in default, but the
court said the mortgagee had his remedy by ejectment or foreclosure, and although he has a
right to possession, he is not yet in possession, and, therefore, not entitled to the rents and
profits. In Miles v. Kolsky, 13 Pa. D. & C. 579 (193o), before Judge Finletter, there was a
default in the Inortgage, whereupon the mortgagee notified the tenant that he had exercised
his right to take possession, and demanded the rent. Pending foreclosure, the mortgagee and
the mortgagor agreed that. the defendant should collect the rents, until the time when the
rights of the parties should be determined. The court gave the rents to the mortgagee. The
case does not bring out clearly whether the lease was before or after the mortgage, but it
seems that the former was the case, inasmuch as the court said the tenant became the tenant of
the mortgagee without attornment, which, as will be seen later, can only be true if the lease
preceded the mortgage. The court decided that the mortgagee could establish his right to
the rent by giving notice to the tenant.
I Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464 (1827) ; Anderson v. Robbins, 823 Me. 422, 19 Atl. 91o
(189o) ; Winnisimmet Trust, Inc. v. Libby, 247 Mass. 56o, 142 N. E. 772 (1924) ; Hinck v.
Cohn, 86 N." J. L. 615, 92 Atl. 378 (i914), approving Sanderson v. Price, 21 N. J. L. 637
(1846) which had overruled Souders v. Vansickle, 8 N. J. L. 313 (1826) ; Jones v. Clark,
20 Johns. 51 (N. Y. 1822) ; Kimball v. Lockwood, 6 R. I. 138 (1859) ; Johnson v. Jones, 9
A. & E. 8og (839).
I The court in Bulger v. Wilderman, supra note i, at 179, assumed for the purposes of
the case that the mortgagee would have no such right.
(269)
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Bulger v. Wilderman is a starting point, and the case is interesting as an expression of judicial recognition of the procedure which the mortgagee adopted.
In view of the necessarily limited scope of this note, certain aspects of the
general problem suggested by the title may be eliminated at once. Those jurisdictions which treat a mortgage as a mere security for the payment of money,
and as passing no estate in the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee,7 have no
difficulty with the situation. In such states, i. e. lien states, the mortgagee has no
right to possession until foreclosure and sale; 8 the occurrence of a default, therefore, does not affect the right of the mortgagor to obtain the rents and profits.
Many of these states are quite liberal in appointing a receiver pending foreclosure,
since the mortgagee has rio legal remedy available to protect his interest until that
time; most states have given the mortgagee statutory aid to this effect.9 The
general problems of receivership have not been considered here.'0 In short, the
writer has attempted to confine himself to a consideration of the right of the
mortgagee to the rents in the so-called title jurisdictions, after default and before
foreclosure.
Obviously, a fundamental understanding of the nature of a mortgage, and
the rights granted thereunder to the mortgagee, is necessary. At early common
law, a mortgage operated as a conveyance in fee, and the mortgagee was treated
as having an absolute estate in the land for all purposes. By means of the intervention of equitable principles, due perhaps to the gradual change in the economic
structure of England, the rigor and hardship of this view was softened, until
today a mortgage, although still an absolute defeasance in form, will only be
regarded as such insofar as it carries out the intention of the parties. Prof.
William H. Lloyd, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, in an article
entitled "The Mortgage Theory of Pennsylvanid"',1 exhaustively deals with the
For an able article on the lien theory see LLOYD, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien

Theory (1923) 32 YAE L. J. 233.
'First
Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. BeaU, 2o8 Iowa I1o7, 225 N. W. 943 (1929);
Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868) ; Grady v. First State Security Co., 179 Minn. 571, 229
N. W. 874 (1930) ; Allen v. Pullam, 223 Mo. App. 1053, 10 S. W. (2d) 64 (1928) ; i JoNEs,
MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) § 16.
9
The Ohio statute is typical: "A receiver may be appointed . . . in the following
cases: . . . 2. In an action by the mortgagee, for the foreclosure of his mortgage and sale
of the mortgaged property, when it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of
being lost, removed or materially injured, or that the condition of the mhortgage has not been
performed, and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt." OHIO
CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 193o) § 11894.
In England, the LAW OF PRoPERTY Act, x5 Gao. V, c. 20 (1925) definitely clears up the
rights of the mortgagee at different stageg of the proceedings. The Act specifically grants
certain powers to the mortgagee, as if they were conferred by the mortgage deed. By Section IO (i), the mortgagee is given: ". . . (iii) A power, when the mortgage money has

become due, to appoint a receiver of the income of the mortgaged property, or any part
thereof; . . ." It is significant that England has finally expressed ina statute, in words
of one syllable, exactly what rights a mortgagee has, and how he can enforce them. Certainly, many American jurisdictions can profit from the experience of a country whose
jurisprudence is many hundreds of years older than our own.
3o For example, some jurisdictions require that waste be shown before a receiver will be
appointed, Cortleyeu v,Hathaway, ii N. J. Eq. 39 (1855). The courts of Minnesota and
Michigan have held that non-payment of interest and taxes, when considered in connection
with the insolvency of the mortgagor, is in the nature of waste, Nusbaum v. Shapero, 249
Mich. 252, 228 N. W. 785 (i93o) ; National Bank v. Reno, 172 Minn. I93, 214 N. W. 886
(I927) ; cf. John Hancock Life Insurance Co. v. Meester, 173 Minn. i8, 216 N. W. 329
(927).
Other states, before they will appoint a receiver, require at least a showing that a
deficiency will probably result upon the sale of the property, and the insolvency of the mortgagor. See Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., i8o App. Div. 69, r67
N. Y. S. 245 (91).
n' (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 43, cited approvingly by Chief Justice von Moschzisker in
Harper v. Consolidated Rubber Co., 284 Pa. 444, 451, 131 At. 356, 358 (1925), and by Judge
Keller, in Bulger v. Wilderman, supra note I, at 171.
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Pennsylvania cases, and his conclusion that "...
as between the parties, the title
is in the mortgagee insofar as it is necessary to render the instrument effective
as a security . . .",11 seems typical of the mortgage theory of other title jurisdictions. 13 It is entirely consonant with this theory to give the mortgagee the
right of possession after default, and in all states he may, therefore, maintain
ejectment. 14 As a matter of fact, under the strict common law theory, the mortgagee had a right to bring ejectment immediately upon the execution of the
mortgage; "I this right has largely been done away with, either by force of
judicial decision 1 or by statute.1"
There are two situations that must be distinguished in considering the ri'
of the mortgagee to the rents, zdz. whether the lease is made before or after the
mortgage. Where the lease is made before the mortgage, it is well settled that the
mortgage operates as an assignment of the mortgagor's reversionary interest.1 '
Privity of estate is created between the mortgagee and the tenant, to whom the
former now stands in the relation of landlord. 19 At common law, before this
relationship could come into existence, it was necessary for the tenant to attorn
to the mortgagee; this was dispensed with by the provisions of the statute of
4 ANNE, c. i6, §§ 9 and IO (17o5). 2 The doctrine was first announced by Lord
Mansfield in the leading English case of Moss v. Gallimore,2' a case that has been
authoritatively cited by English and American decisions ever since. The mort=Ibid. at 57.
' See I JONES, op. cit. supra note 8, § 18 et seq.
" Zimmern v. People's Bank, 2o3 Ala. 21, 81 So. 811 (igig) ; Hagerstown v. Groh, ioi
Md. 560, 6I At 467 (19o5) ; Fluck v. Replogle, 13 Pa. 405 (I85o). In McCall v. Lenox, 9
S. & R. 302, 304 (1823), Chief Justice Tilghman, in speaking of the rights of a mortgagee
upon default, says: "He may proceed by way of ejectment, to recover the possession of the
premises, or he may have a scire facias on the mortgage, or an action of debt on the bond."
" See cases cited supra note 14; 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 8, § 868, and cases cited. In
Pennsylvania, it has been repeatedly stated that the mortgagee has a right to possession, and
to maintain ejectment, even before default. See Youngman v. Elmira & Williamsport R. R.
Co., 65 Pa. 278, 285 (1870) where Sharswood, J., is especially emphatic: "That a mortgagee
or his assignee may maintain ejectment and recover possession of the mortgaged property
before the condition is broken, unless there is a stipulation in the instrument to the contrary,
is too well settled in this state to be any longer a subject of question." But see Guthrie v.
Kohle, 46 Pa. 331 (f863). The writer has been unable to find any case which expressly stands
for this proposition. As a matter of fact, it is extremely doubtful Whether a court would
grant such relief today as a matter of right; to do so would seem to be inconsistent with the
actual practice and with the intention of the parties. Judge Sharswood, himself, modifies
the above stated rule, in Soper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. 219, 224 (1872), where he adds the following qualification: ". . . or it does not appear otherwise to have been the intention of
the parties that the mortgagor should hold possession until breach." Note the passage from
Bulger v. Wilderman, supra note -I, -where the court, in speaking of the nature of the mortgage being considered, and the rights granted thereunder, says at i75: ".

.

. it granted to

the mortgagee, on- breach of condition, the right to possession." (Italics the writer's.)
I1Kransz v. Uedelhofen, 193 Ill. 477, 62 N. E. 239 (igoi).
7
1 VT. Gmx. LAWS (1917) §2129: "Every mortgagor shall, until condition broken, have,
as against the mortgagee, the legal right of possession to the mortgaged premises, unless it is
otherwise stipulated in the mortgage deed."
IsKing v. Housatonic R. Co., 45 Conn. 226 (1877); Burden v. Thayer, 44 Mass. 76
(1841) ; Moss v. Gallimore, I Doug. 279 (1779) ; 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 8, § 978; I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) § 146 (e) ; I SmiTH's LEADING CASES (8th ed. with
notes by Hare and Wallace, 1885) Part I, p. 689 (note appended to Moss v. Gallimore). Any
action .for the rent must be brought in the name of the mortgagee, as he is the legal owner,
Doe v. Edwards, 5 B. & A. io65 (1834).
"In Rogers v. Humphreys, 4 A. & E. 299, 31J (1835), Denman, C. J., says: "And if
there be a lease, and such lease is prior to the mortgage, the mortgagee has the same rights
against the lessee and those claiming under him that the mortgagor had, and no other than he
had, and his remedy must be on the lease as assignee of the reversion .
-' This statute is in force in Pennsylvania, as it is in most American jurisdictions, RoBERT's DIGEST (2d ed. 1847) 41, 44. See Tilford v. Fleming, 64 Pa. 300 (187o).
' Supra note I8.
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gage, being an assignment of the reversion, carries with it the2 legal title to the
rent, and the mortgagee can assert his right thereto at any time. " Usually, however, the mortgagee does not want the rent; he wants the interest on his investment. He does not want to go to the trouble of collecting the rents himself,
account for themr to the mortgagor, and subject himself to the careful scrutiny
and burdens which the courts impose upon a mortgagee in possession. 3 Therefore, it is the usual practice for the mortgagor to remain in possession and receive
the rents; he receives them to his own use and not to that of the mortgagee. 24
Once there has been a default in the conditions of the mortgage, the mortgagee can
put an end to the right of the mortgagor to receive the rents; 2. a mere notice to
the tenant to pay him will accomplish that result.26 The tenant must obey the
mortgagee's demand; should he refuse, and continue to pay the mortgagor, 27
it
seems clear that the mortgagee would have a right to distrain for the rent.
There are no cases in Pennsylvania in which the mortgagee, before foreclosure, has attemptd to secure the rents accruing under a lease made before the
mortgage. 28 There is a dictum by Judge Rogers in Myers v. White,9 as follows:
"There has been an essential departure from the law of England in
Pennsylvania, for the mortgagee has no estate, property or interest in the
land until he takes possession of the property. -Nor has it, as I believe, ever
I In Moss v. Gallimore, supra note 18, the lease preceded the mortgage, and the mortgagee, after default, notified the tenant not to pay the mortgagor, but to pay him. The court
held that the mortgagee could distrain for the rent. Lord Mansfield said (at 282) : "Now,
a mortgagor, is not properly tenant-at-will to the mortgagee, for he is not to pay him rent
• He is like a tenant-at-will. The mortgagor receives the rent by a tacit agreement
with the mortgagee, but the mortgagee may put an end to this agreement when he pleases.
He has the legal title to the rent, and the tenant, in the present case, cannot be dannified, for
the mortgagor can never oblige him to pay over again the rent which has been levied by this
distress."
'z See 2 JoNEs, op. cit. supranote 8, § 1425 et seq.
Teal v. Walker, III U. S. 242, 4 Sup. Ct. 420 (1884) ; Dillon v. Dyer, 258 Ill.
App: 144
(ig3o) ; Talbot's Appeal, 2 Walk. 67 (Pa. 1885). The mortgagee is usually content to receive his interest promptly, and to rely upon the security of the mortgage, rather than to burden himself with accounting for the rents. The exact relation between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, while the former continues to receive the rents, is hard to define. As to the legal
effect of the situation, the law is quite clear. The mortgagor is under no duty to account to
the mortgagee for the rents thus received; he may collect them and appropriate them to his
own use. Trent v. Hunt, 9 Exch. 14 (1853). This case even went one step further, for it
decided that under such circumstances, the rent being in arrears, the mortgagor had authority
to make a lawful distress upon the tenant in the mortgagee's name. Baron Alderson says
(at 23) : "But, instead of giving notice to tie tenant to pay the rent to himself, he permits
the mortgagor to go on receiving the rent as before. . . . The circumstances shew that
the real owner of the rent (the mortgagee) is willing that the mortgagor should receive the
rent and have it for his own absolute use. He also expects, of course, that the interest due
to him will be regularly paid; and one most obvious and natural source for the mortgagor to
obtain funds to enable him to pay this interest is the rent of the mortgaged property . . .",
and he then concludes that it it is a reasonable inference that the mortgagor has the proper
authority to distrain in the mortgagee's name. See 2 JONES, op. cit. supra note 8, §§ 979, 98o.
I Moss v. Gallimore, supra note 18. The mortgagor, while in possession, is not a trespasser; he cannot, therefore, be sued for the mesne profits until entry by the mortgagee, Wilder v. Houghton, I Pick. 87 (Mass. 1822). 'See Talbot's Appeal, supra note 24.
'Burden
v. Thayer, supra. note 18. In that case, Chief Justice Shaw says, at 79:
the mortgagee cannot disturb the possession of the lessee, who has a prior title; and
therefore he cannot enter. But as the mortgage transfers the reversion, to which the rent
is incident; . . . he may give notice of his right to the lessee, and of his election to take
the rents; and then the lessee becomes bound to pay the rent to him as mortgagee." Noble
v. Brooks, 224 Mass. 288, 112 N. E. 649 (ii6),
accord.
2 See 2 JONES, op. cit. si'pra note 8, § 980; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I8, § 334 (e),
and cases cited. See also Rogers v. Humphreys, supra note 19.
2 But see Miles v. Kolsky, supra note 4.
2I Rawle 353, 355 (1829).

NOTES

been understood that such a privity exists, as that a mortgagee can compel
the tenant of the mortgagor to pay him the rent, whether the lease was executed eitler before or after the mortgage."

(Italics the writer's.)

It is submitted that this is an inaccurate statement of the law. The present mortgage theory of this state, as indicated by the most recent decisions, is that ". . . the
title is in the mortgagee insofar as it is necessary to render the instrument effective
as a security", 3 and once this is accepted the result must follow that the mortgage
operates as an assignment of the reversion. In legal contemplation the tenant in
possession represents the possession of the mortgagee, and there is no need for
the mortgagee to take possession, as Judge Rogers requires. He is in possession,
and all he has to do is to put an end to the authority of the mortgagor to receive
the rents, which he can do by notifying the tenant.8 1 After such notice, the tenant would be denying the title of his landlord, the mortgagee, should he continue to
pay rent to the mortgagor, and the mortgagee would have a right, as elsewhere,
to distrain for the rent. There is no reason why Pennsylvania should not be in
accord with other jurisdictions on this point.
Where, however, the mortgage precedes the lease, the legal significance of the
transactions is different. There is no privity between the mortgagee and the
tenant; therefore the former cannot exercise the rights of a landlord against
the latter.3 2 However, since the mortgagee acquired his interest first, that interest
is paramount and the rights of the tenant are subject thereto. 8 The rights of
the latter cannot rise any higher than those of his landlord, the mortgagor. Accordingly, the mortgagee can exercise the same rights against the tenant that he
could have exercised against the mortgagor. Just as where the lease preceded
the mortgage, it is customary for the mortgagee after the execution of the mortgage to allow the mortgagor to remain in possession and receive the rents. The
mortgagor receives the rents to his own use, and does not have to account for
Once there is a default, the mortgagee has a right
them to the mortgagee.8
to possession, and to the rents and profits that are an incident thereto. He may
notify the tenant to pay him, and should he succeed in getting the tenant to
recognize his demand, the legal status of the parties is clear. The tenant is
not denying his landlord's title; he is merely recognizing a superior and paramount interest. 35 A payment to the mortgagee is a good defense to a subsequent
action by the mortgagor for the same rent.38 The mortgagee takes possession of
r0See supra note Ii.
For an excellent consideration 6f the question, see note, i Smith's Leading Cases, supra
note 18.
IMerchants' Union Trust Co. v. New Phila. Graphite Co., io Del. Ch. I8, 83 At. 520
(1912); Burke v. Willard, 243 Mass. 547, 137 N. E. 744 (1923); Rogers v. Humphreys,
supra note ig. In the Delaware case, the court says, at 27: "While a mortgagee may, after
notice and demand, recover rents and profits from a lessee who holds under a lease made
prior to the mortgage, there is a clear and well settled distinction in the law between a lease
made by the mortgagor prior, and one made subsequent, to the mortgage. In the latter case
the mortgagee cannot distrain, or sue for rent unless an authority to that effect is contained
in the mortgage, because there is no privity of contract or estate between the mortgagee and
the tenant." (Citing cases.)
McKircher v. Hawley, i6 Johns. 289 (N. Y. 1819) ; Keech v. Hall, i Doug. 21 (1778);
i TIFFANY, op. cl. supra note i8, § 73 (a).
See supra note 24. If this is true where the lease precedes the mortgage, a fortiori
where the lease is after the mortgage.
IAnderson v. Robbins, supra note 5. As the court says in Bulger v. Wilderman, supra
note i, at 179: "There is consequently here no denial by the tenant of his landlord's title, but
a recognition by the tenant of the termination of the landlord's possession by the prior and
paramount right granted by him or to which the lease was from its inception subject." (Citing cases.)
"Cases cited supra note 5.
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the property through the tenant, and the old tenancy is destroyed. Naturally, the
mortgagee has to apply the rents to his debt, and account for any excess to the
mortgagor. The new tenancy between the mortgagee and tenant is apparently
one on a year to year basis; the3 7mortgagee, in accepting the rent, does not thereby
adopt or ratify the prior lease.

Should the tenant refuse to attorn to the mortgagee, following a notice and
uniform in holding that the mortgagee
demand for payment, the cases are quite
33
The theory is that the mortgagee is
cannot thereafter distrain for the rent.
and he has not done
not entitled to the rents until he has obtained possession;
39
Although the mortgagee can
so by merely notifying the tenant to pay him.
40
then sue the tenant as a trespasser and recover the mesne profits, such a
remedy would be valueless against the typical, modem "fly-by-night" tenant. The
result is, therefore, that, pending foreclosure, the mortgagee has a right but no
adequate method of enforcing it. Accordingly, in most jurisdictions, the mortgagee has been the recipient of equitable or statutory aid in the nature of a right
to petition for the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents and profits
during the period of default.
Unfortunately, the Pennsylvania mortgagee, in this situation, is without a
suitable remedy. Unless he can get the tenant to pay him, he is, because of practical considerations, virtually compelled to allow the foreclosure proceeding to
take its course. He cannot get a receiver appointed, for there does not seem
to be any common law authority in this state for such action; the legal remedy
is considered adequate. 41 The only legal remedy available, however, is ejectment, and this remedy is worth nothing; the foreclosure would be determined
long before the ejectment case came to an issue. Wily mortgagors have taken
of defense to the scire facias,
advantage of this situation, and, by filing an affidavit
42
or by petitioning for stay of the Sheriff's sale, they are able to delay the sale of
the property, during which time they continue to receive the rents without paying
the taxes, interest, etc. The Pennsylvania law, as it now stands, is peculiarly
adapted to such practices. A judicial holding that the mortgagee can take possession by notice and demand to the tenant, while most desirable, would be theoretically unsound--the relief does not seem to lie through the medium of the courts.
to the
The Judiciary itself has recognized this fact, and a Committee has reported
43
After
last Judicial Conference in favor of legislative aid for the mortgagee.
Gartside v. Outley, 58 Ill. 210 (871); Corbett v. Plowden, [1884] 25 Ch. Div. 678.
The facts of the latter case are interesting: A mortgaged certain property to B, and then
leased the property to C for a 21 year period, reserving the right to determine the leasehold
at the end of 7 and 14 years. Shortly after the lease, B notified C to pay the rent to him.
C reluctantly obeyed, after seeking legal advice. A year later, C gave up possession df the
property. B sought to specifically enforce the provisions of the old lease, but the court gave
judgment for C on the ground that a tenancy from year to year was created between B and
C, automatically ending the old lease.
IMack v. Beeland Co., 21 Ala. App. 97, 105 So. 722 (,925) ; Trask v. Kelleher, 93 Vt.
371,

1o7

Ati. 486 (1919) ; Evans v. Elliot, 9 A. & E. 342 (1838), and cases cited supra note 33.

"Lord Denman, in Evans v. Elliot, supra note 38, states the question very aptly, at 353:
(the question is) whether the tenant of a mortgagor, by virtue of a lease posterior to
the mortgage, becomes tenant to the mortgagee as soon as the latter gives him notice that
there is a mortgage, and that the money has not been paid." He proceeds to answer this in
the negative, and holds that the tenant must attorn before the mortgagee can distrain.
40 See TFFANY, op. cit. supra note 18, § 73a (2), and cases cited.
"See Rosenblatt B. & L. v. Miller, 13 Pa. D. & C. 73 (I929), decided by Judge Kun.
'The practice of "milking" the property became quite prevalent in the past few years.
The courts in many instances did as much as they could to prevent this by requiring the
mortgagor, where he petitioned for a stay, to put up security to indemnify the mortgagee. Of
course, this did not take care of the situatior between default and the time when the foreclosure would normally terminate.
"The writer is indebted to judge Paul N. Schaeffer, President Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas of Berks County, for the report of the Committee, and for other materials.
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discarding various types of receivership, the Committee recommended the enactment of a statute which would give the court the right, upon petition by the
mortgagee after the commencement of foreclosure proceedings, to appoint a
sequestrator for the rents. The Committee recognized the fact that there would
be grave doubts as to the constitutionality of such a statute, as it would seem
repugnant to Article III, Section 7 of the State Constitution as being a "special
act . . . providing or changing methods for the collection of debts". The Committee suggested, therefore, that a constitutional amendment would be necessary.
That there is a real need for some legislation of this sort seems rather dear;
the times are especially appropriate for immediate action.
H. N. S.

THE MAcINTOsH CAsE-The Congress of the United States, under direct
authority of the Constitution,' has enacted that an applicant for citizenship in
the United States shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath
in open court that he "will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same". 2 The question whether Congress, in prescribing this
oath, has exacted a promise to bear arms as a condition of its grant of naturalization has come before the Supreme Court of the United States on only three
occasions. 3 In the first of these cases, the Schwimner case, 4 there was involved
also the further question whether the applicant showed an attachment to the
principles of the Constitution as required by the Naturalization Act,5 and the
Court based its decision largely upon a determination of this point.6 However,
in the recent Macintosh.7 and Bland cases, since both applicants were found to
be of good moral character and attached to the principles of the Constitution, there
remained only the question whether an unconditional promise of willingr--s to
bear arms was required by the oath of allegiance.9
CoNsT. U. S. art. i, § 8, cl. 4.
STAT. 596 (igo6), 8 U. S. C. A. §381 (1928).
2
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448 (ig9) ; United States v.
234

Macintosh, 283 U. S. 6o5, 51 Sup. Ct. 570 (1931), petition for rehearing denied by the Supreme
Court, U. S. Daily, Oct. 13, 1931, at page 6; United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636, 5! Sup.
Ct. 569 (193I), petition for rehearing denied by the Supreme Court, U. S. Daily, Oct. 13,
1931, at page 6.
'United States v. Schwimmer, supra note 3, at 648, 49 Sup. Ct. at 449.' The Supreme
Court affirmed (three judges dissenting) the denial of citizenship to a woman pacifist who
unqualifiedly refused to bear arms personally and who stated that she had "no sense of nationalism, only a cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family".
G34 STAT. 596 (igo6), 8 U. S. C. A. §382 (1928).

6Note (1931) 25 ILL. L. REv. 723, 725.
"Uhited States v. Macintosh, supra note 3. The Supreme Court (four judges dissenting)
denied grant of citizenship to a world-war Canadian army chaplain, now a Baptist minister
and divinity school professor, as the result of his refusal to take the oath of allegiance
except with the qualification that he would bear arms only in a war which in his opinion was
morally justified. Cf. In re Clarke, 3o Pa. 321, 152 Atl. 92 (i93o) ; where an applicant for
citizenship was refused when he sought to qualify the oath by a declaration that he would
support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States "so far as they are in
accord with the moral law of Jesus Chrise'.
'United States v. Bland, supra note 3. The Supreme Court (four judges dissenting)
decided against the grant of citizenship to a world war nurse, the daughter of a Canadian
Episcopalian minister, who stated that her religious convictions forbade her personally bearing arms, and who was unwilling to take the oath of allegiance except with the qualification
"as far as my conscience as a Christian will allow".
I United States v. Macintosh, supra note 3, at 627, 51 Sup. Ct. at 576.
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The naturalization oath is substantially the same as the general oath required
of all holders of public office 0 and of applicants for passports." Yet a promise
to bear arms is never exacted of public office holders when they are sworn into
office, 1 2 and the State department has declared that an unwillingness to bear arms

is not such a mental reservation to the oath of allegiance required for a passport
as would disqualify the applicant.' 3 Since there does not seem to be included
within the meaning of these latter two oaths the requirement of willingness to
bear arms in defense of the United States, it would seem at first glance that
applying the familiar rules of interpretation, the oath required of an applicant
for citizenship, being the same in verbiage, should be construed to have the same
meaning. However, the general oath prescribed for public officers is that also
prescribed for officers of the military and naval service,' 4 and to follow this line
of argument and conclude therefrom that this oath, too, does not include in it a
promise of willingness to bear arms in defense of the United States would lead
to an utterly ridiculous result. Congress could not have intended that the words
of these oaths, to be used on different occasions for different purposes, were
to convey the identical meaning for each purpose. Thus it would seem that the
only possible way of ascertaining what significance Congress really intended to
attach to the oath is to examine the purpose for which the oath is being used
and the circumstances surrounding its use.
It goes almost without saying that Congress, in prescribing the oath for
public officers could not have intended to require a willingness to bear arms as
a prerequisite to the holding of that office, for the Constitution specifically provides that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under the United States".' 5 Since a promise to willingly engage
in war would be contrary to the tenets of some religious groups among our citizens, to require such a promise would necessarily be to exclude their members
from public office because of a religious test, a situation clearly not contemplated
nor permitted by the Constitution.
The passport is practically only a certificate stating the citizenship or status
of the person to whom it is granted, and is issued for purposes of identification
and protection to those who are traveling abroad.'" The oath required has not
been prescribed by Congress, but, along with the other rules governing the issuance of passports, has been formulated by the President in accordance with the
provisions of the statute.' Hence, there is no question in this instance of any
intent on the part of Congress as to the meaning of the oath. Passports are
necessary not because of any demand of the United States, but because of the
requirements of the countries through which the applicant may travel. A citizen
by virtue of his citizenship is entitled to the protection of the United States
11"The oath to be taken by any person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit
either in the civil, military or naval service, except the President of the United States shall
be as follows . . . 'that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter'." 12 STAT. 502; 15 STAT. 85; 16 STAT. 412; 23 STAT. 22 (1884), 5 U. S. C. A.
§16 (1928).
"VAN

DYNE, NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1907), 384, 385, 386 (forms of

application for passport).
'United States v. Macintosh, supra note 3, at 632, 51 Sup. Ct. at 578.
= See BoEcxEL, BErwmEN WAR AND PEACE (1928), 304, 306-7.
"General oath of office, supra note Io.
CoNsT. art. 6, § 3.
"VAN DYNE, op. cit. supra note ii, at 363; HOLLAND & JENKS, CITIZES
(Pa. ed. 1904) 38.

'732

STAT.

386

(1902), 22 U.

S. C. A.

§211 (1928).
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whether he be at home or abroad. His gain by virtue of the passport is only the
request by the United States on his behalf that other governments afford him the
protection of their laws. Unless the citizen intends to use the passport for an
unlawful purpose, he is entitled to it as a matter of right."8 Since this is the
nature of a passport it would hardly seem reasonable or just to demand of the
citizen applying for a passport more than would ordinarily be required of him
in his status as a citizen, namely to require him to promise to bear arms of his
own volition, thus foregoing any privilege of exemption from military service
which Congress might bestow upon him in the event of war.
The grant of citizenship by its very nature embraces a much broader scope.
It involves in the recipient of the grant much more than merely assuming the
restricted duties of a particular office or receiving a privilege of a passport to
which in most instances he is entitled as a matter of right. Citizenship is, membership in a political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the
member and a duty of protection on the part of society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. The grant of citizenship confers
upon the alien all the rights and privileges which our government may give, including the right to hold every public office except that of President. 9 Aliens
are not granted citizenship as a privilege which they may demand, but as an act
of grace by the government, which may fix such conditions as it sees fit.20 Since
Congress has not made it clear in the words of the oath of allegiance whether
or not a willingness to bear arms is one of these conditions, its intention in the
matter must be drawn from its general policy towards citizenship in general and
aliens in particular.
That it is the duty of citizens, 21 by force of arms, to defend our government
against all enemies whenever the necessity arises is universally affirmed both as
a proposition of law,22 and as a fundamental tenet of political science. 23 In the
Colonies before the separation from England the right to enforce military service
was unquestioned.2 4 In fact, by the constitutions of at least nine states, the duty
of the citizen to render military service and the power to compel him against his

Fed.

I HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAW (1922) § 401.
SLuria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 22, 34 Sup. Ct. xo, 13 (1913).
'United States v. Akhay Kumar Mozumdar 296 Fed. 173 (S. D. Cal.

1923) ; aff'd 299
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
This duty is not confined to citizens alone, but extends also to resident aliens. It seems
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to be a settled principle of international law that the sovereign may compel resident aliens to
serve in its military forces to repel invasion if the alien chooses to remain within the territorial limits of the sovereign after the necessity arises. However, while this principle is recognized and affirmed in the United States, there has been a definite policy up to the present
time not to enforce it against those aliens who have not declared their intentions of becoming
citizens. 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note IS, §§ 625, 626, 627; HAL., INTERNATioNAL LAW (5th
ed. 1904) 207-209.

' United States v. Schwimmer, supranote 3, at 650, 49 Sup. Ct. at 450; Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 378, 38 Sup. Ct. i59, 16I (1918) ; In re D-, 290 Fed. 863, 864 (N. D.
Ohio 1923) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II, 29, 25 Sup. Ct 358, 362 (1908). In
England it is certain that before the Norman Conquest the duty of the great militant body of
citizens was recognized and enforceable, BLACXSTONE, COMaENTARIES (Lewis ed. 1902) c.
13; and that such a duty exists has been pronounced by the English courts. King v. Inhabitants of Rotherfield Greys, I Barn. & Cress. 345, 349 (1823). The latest insistence by England on the performance of this duty was evidenced by the Military Service Act, 5 & 6 GEO.
V, c. 104, p. 367 (1916); amended by 6 & 7 GEo. V, c. 15, p. 33 (1916). The STATESMAN'S
YEARIBOO
(1917) pP. 656-1353, cites thirty-three governments as enforcing military service,

including the major continental nations.
IBRYcE, THE HINDRANcEs TO GOOD

CITIZENSHIP (910)
7; MAXSON, CITIZENSHIP
(1930), 13, 237; VATTEL, LAW OF NATION S (Chitty ed. with Am. Notes 1852), book III, c.
I and 2.
" Lanahan v. Binge, 30 Conn. 438, 443, 444; Selective Draft Law Cases, suprc note 22,
at 379, 38 Sup. Ct. at 162.
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consent to do so was expressly sanctioned..2 5 By the Constitution this duty
was
20
recognized and the power to raise armies was conferred upon Congress.
Congress has never, from its inception under the Constitution, hesitated
to exercise this power."' But in so doing there has been a definite policy to relieve
from the duty of bearing arms at least those persons whose objections to bearing
arms are in conformance with the'principles of well-recognized religious sects.28
Nor has Congress held steadfast to this policy of restricting its grace to those
objectors only who are members of such religious groups, for on at least one
occasion, exemption from military service has been allowed to persons objecting
to bearing arms because of a so-called religious belief, without the further requirement that this belief be that of a well-established religious sect. 9
If these were.the only indications of the governmental attitude toward the
question of compulsory military duty, it would seem to be only reasonable to
conclude that, in view of the historical, as well as philosophical," evidence of the
recognition of the right of a citizen to be excused from military service as
secured by numerous state statutes and constitutions,. 1 no imperative need exists
which demands that either the courts or the naturalization boards construe the
oath of allegiance as requiring a promise to bear arms. 2
But there have been other indications of policy inconsistent with the theory
that religious freedom, as set forth in the Constitution of the United States I2 and
in the various state constitutions,8" excuses and relieves from a non-compliance
with the laws so long as that non-compliance is in conformity with the principles
of a religion. The constitutions of several states in providing for religious free' An illustration is afforded by the following provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution
of 1776: "That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life,
liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent
thereto." Art. 8, 5 THoRPE, AMERcAI CHARTER, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIC LAWS
(igog), 3o81-3o83. See also Constitution of Vermont, 1777, c. I, art. 9, 6 THORPE, ibid. 37373740; New York, 1777, art. 40, 5 ibid. 2637; Mass. Bill of Rights, 1780, art. 1O, 3 ibid. 188818gi; New Hampshire, 1784, part I, Bill of Rights, art. 12, 4 ibid. 2453-2455; Delaware,
1776, art. 9, i ibid. 562-564; Virginia , 1776, Militia, 7 ibid. 3817; Georgia, 1777, arts. 33, 35,
2 ibid. 777, 782; Maryland, 1776, art. 33, 3 ibid. 1696. The constitutions of New Jersey,
Rhode Island, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Connecticut are silent on this point.
CoNsT. U. S. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
Selective Draft Law Cases, supra note 22, at 384-387, 38 Sup. Ct at 163-i64, and military service acts therein cited.
23 13 STAT. 4, § 17 (1864) ; 32 STAT. 775 (1903), 2 COMP. STAT. (1913) 1193, § 3043; 39
STAT. 197 (ii6), 32 U. S. C. A. §3 (1928); Selective Draft Act, 4o STAr. 78 (1917), 50
nothing in this act contained shall be
U. S. C. A. 165 (1928) which provides that ". ..
construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for
who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present
organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation
therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations."
There are similar provisions for exemption in the previous statutes cited with terms no
narrower in their scope.
m Act of Jan. 21, 19o3, supra note 28. It is to be noted that this act giving greater latitude
in exemption from military service was a peace time measure, whereas the Selective Draft Act
of May 18, 1917, supra note 28, which is far more restrictive, was an emergency measure
made necessary by the entrance of the United States into the World War.
' "The rights of conscience are, indeed, beyond the just reach of any human power.
They are given by God and cannot be encroached upon by human authority, without a criminal disobedience of the precepts of natural, as well as of revealed religion." 2 STORY, COXsTrrUTIoIW (5th ed. I89I) § 1876; 2 CooLEY, CoIqsTrrUTIoNAL LnmrrAxoNs (8th ed. 1927)
983. 9 See Macintosh v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 845, 847, 848n. (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).

'2See
note (931) 40 YALE L. J. 653, 655.
23

CoNsr. U. S., amend. I.
* See Macintosh v. United States, supra note 31.
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dom. have declared expressly that such freedom shall not be construed to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state. 35 Nor have the courts condoned acts done in violation of
the laws because done under the creed of a religion or by one following the
dictates of his conscience. 0
It is stated that compelling an alien to promise to bear arms in advance
of the passage of any conscription act as a condition of becoming a citizen is
compelling him to do something more than is required of a native-born citizen.37
But it is equally true that permitting the alien to refuse to bear arms in advance
would be to give him a right not held by native-born citizens, for exemption from
military service is a privilege conferred at the discretion of Congress and not a
right"8 Thus there arises a situation where either the alien must be put at a
nominal disadvantage as compared with a native-born citizen or the United
States must surrender its right to compel him to serve in its army in its defense.
Congress in its legislation in regard to aliens has shown no inclination to favor
the alien to the disadvantage of the 'United States. In the Naturalization Act it
has surrounded the subject of admission to citizenship with numerous conditions
and precautions.3 " At the entrance of the United States into the World War,
' The Constitution of New York of 1777 provided as follows: "The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever hereafter be allowed, within this state, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of
conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state." Art. xxxviii, 5 THORPE,
op. cit. .supranote 25, at 2637. The same declaration is repeated in the constitution of 1822,
art. vii, § 3, ibid. 2648, and in those of 1846, art. I, § 3, ibid. 2653, and of 1894, art. I, § 3,
ibid. 2694, except that for the words "hereby granted", the words "hereby secured" are substituted.
The constitutions of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, and South Carolina contain a similar declaration.
The Supreme Court has declared that an unwillingness to bear arms is an act endangering
the safety of the state. See United States v. Schwimmer, supra note 3, at 650, 49 Sup. Ct.
at 450.

' Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.145 (1878) (Polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.
S.333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299 (I89O) (Polygamy) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S.47, 39 Sup.
Ct. 247 (I919) (distribution of pamphlets urging resistance to the Draft Acts); Debs v.
United States, 249 U. S.211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1919) (speaking against war and hindering
recruiting) ; Ferreter v. Tyler, 48 Vt 444 (1876) (children excluded from school because of
absence contrary to rules though such absence for purpose of attending religious services of
Roman Catholic church) ; see United States v. Schwimmer, supra note 3, at 652, 49 Sup. Ct.
at 450 (disposition to encourage others in refusal to bear arms).
It is argued that a line could be "pricked out" between opinions such as those expressed
by the applicants in the Bland and Macintosh cases. See note (I93I) 40 YALE L. J. supra
note 32, at 657n. But it would seem that since the Schwimmer case this has become a practical impossibility, for in that case there is no overt act, merely a conscientious objection to
all wars. The court expressed the opinion that so-called pacifists were' not content to keep
their views to themselves, but were prone to attempt to influence others. And in view of the
opinion of Judge Manton in Macintosh v. United States, supra note 31, at 848 that "A citizen
sharing. views -which amount to conscientious or religious scruples against bearing arms in
what he regards as an unjustified war is akin to one having conscientious scruples against
all wars", the difficulty of "pricking out" a line between the cases in this respect becomes
apparent.
Macintosh v. United States, supra note 31, at 847.
sSee Jacobson v. Massachusetts, i97 U. S. II, 29, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 362 (0905).
"Thus, among other provisions it is required that the applicant not only shall reside
continuously within the United States for a period of at least five years immediately preceding his application, but shall make a preliminary declaration of his intention to become a
citizen at least two years prior to his admission. He must produce the testimony of witnesses as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the
Constitution, and in open court take an oath renouncing his former allegiance and pledging
future allegiance to the United States. At the final hearing in open court, he and his witnesses must be examined under oath, and the government may appear for the purposes of
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Congress declared that those aliens who had applied for citizenship and thereby
became subject under the Selective Draft Act to compulsory military service and
who later, for the purpose of escaping such military service, withdrew their
declarations of intention to become citizens were forever debarred from citizenship.40 . In view of this particular legislation of Congress taken in conjunction
with the settled principle that citizenship is a high privilege and when doubts
exist concerning a grant of it, they should be resolved in favor of the United
States and against the claimant, 41 there would seem to be no alternative except to
conclude that there is afforded the courts a reasonable basis for placing a different interpretation upon the oath required for naturalization and for holding
that a refusal to bear arms is such
a mental reservation as would disqualify the
42
applicant from taking the oath.

The real question in the case is whether Congress has demanded that the
applicant for citizenship affirm his willingness to bear arms. This is not one
which can be dogmatically answered from a mere perusal of the text of the
Naturalization Act. The fundamental problem involved is to ascertain the attitude of our government in the age old conflict between the "right" of the individual, as an individual, to follow the "dictates" of his own conscience as a paramount rule of conduct, and the "right" of the state to impose such restrictions
and enforce such obligations on the individuals within its jurisdiction as it may
consider socially beneficial or necessary. In the broad general field of granting
special privileges because of religious belief our state and federal government
throughout their history have been by no means consistent in their attitudes.
And since this is so, the question, while it has been answered in the affirmative
in the Macintosh and Bland cases and hence is the law of the land, 42 is, to legal
and political theorists, still one the answer to which must depend- largely upon
the emotional reaction and philosophy of the individual considering the question.4 4
cross-examining in respect of 'any matters touching or in any way affecting his right to admission', introduce countervailing evidence, and be heard in opposition." United States v.
Macintosh, supra note 3, at 615, 616, 51 Sup. Ct. at 572.
' See Amendment to Selective Draft Act, supra note 28, Comv. ST. ANN. Supp. I919
§2o44b, 50 U. S. C. A. 167 (2928).
' United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463, 48 Sup. Ct. 328 (1928).
"In re Roeper, 274 Fed. 490 (D. Del. 1921) ; In re D-, supra note 22; In re Clarke,
supra note 8; see also State ex rel. Weisz v. District Court, 6I Mont. 42 ,

2o2

Pac. 387

(1921).

That Congress as a whole is not agreed as to the answer to the question is illustrated
by two bills introduced into Congress after the decision in the Schwimmer case. One proposed
law, introduced in the House of Representatives, [H. R- 3547 (7oth Cong., ist Sess.)] provided that no person be debarred from citizenship by reason of religious views or philosophical opinions with respect to war; and another introduced in the Senate, [15o6 (70th Cong.,
Ist Sess.)] provided that before admission to citizenship the applicant should swear that
when called upon he would bear arms in defense of the United States.
"Thus James Locke, who drafted a constitution for the colony of the Carolinas with
such rigorous provisions for enforced military duty that the colonists refused to accept it,
conceived of the political power of a government as "a right of making laws with penalty
of death and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving property, and
of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in defense of the
Commonwealth from foreign injury." STEPHENS, HoRAE SABBATICAE (1892), p. 143. The
contrary attitude is expressed by Dean Carpenter of the Oregon Law School when he says,
"Legal duties and moral scruples are distinct. The state may compel performance of legal
duties and in doing so trample upon the citizen's moral scruples, but the state cannot suppress
his scruples, and no state, if it is wise, will ever make him promise to forego his scruples.
As Spinoza says, 'The less control the state has over the mind, the better for the citizen and
the state' ". Carpenter, The Promise to Bear Arms as a Prereqidteto Naturalized Citizenship, iO Om. L. REv. 375, 379 (1931).
For discussion of the problem see PLATO: REPUBLIC; JowETHI, AmsTomE's POLITICS
(I92i) ; WnILs, TRACrATUS PoLIacus OF SPINOZA (1862) cc. 8, 20; HoBBFss, LEVIATHAN
( 4 th ed. 1887).
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But looking only at the naturalization legislation of Congress, the result will
depend on the meaning of the words "support and defend the Constitution and
laws of the United States against all enemies". These words in the light of the
policy pursued in the past by Congress with particular reference to aliens seem to
make the conclusion of the majority of the Court in the Macintosh and Bland
cases inescapable.

S.S.

IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN TRADE NAME SALES-In modem times

there has

been a tremendous increase in the volume of trade name sales. This is, of course,
but a natural consequence of an advertising era which has resulted in the trade
names of commodities becoming familiar to all. What is the legal liability of the
vendor attendant to such a sale? Judicial confusion in the determination of this
question has been widespread. 1
At common law, the courts recognized that implied warranties of quality
arose only upon the reasonable reliance of the buyer upon the judgment of the
seller, and as the former might vary, so might the liability of the seller .2 Where
the buyer notified the seller of his particular purpose and relied upon him to
supply goods suitable for that purpose, the seller was held liable under an implied
warranty of fitness for the particular purpose. 3 But where the buyer exercised
his own judgment as to the fitness of the goods for his particular purpose and
ordered "known, described, and definite" articles, only an implied warranty of
merchantability was enforced. 4 These rules still obtain in those states-which
have not adopted the UNIFORM SALES AcT.5
'Much of the difficulty in determining whether there is an implied warranty of merchant-

able quality in the sale of a specified article I'y its patent or trade name may be resolved by
defining the term "merchantable quality" with' reference to a sale of goods. The early view
was to hold that it meant that the goods are at least of medium quality or goodness. Howard
v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350 (N. Y. i84o). Some courts require that the. goods must meet the
description of the article purchased, Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 9o W. Va. 428, Irr
S. E. so (1922); Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors, Ltd., [igio] 2
K. B. 831; while others require that they shall reasonably fit the general purpose for which
they were sold, American Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., io8 Kan. 69o, 196 Pac. rrrr (i92I) ;
Perhaps a more precise
Parker v. Shaghalian Co., 244 Mass. i9, 138 N. E. 236 (923).
definition, would be that the goods, with their defects known, shall be salable as the goods of
the general kind they were. supposed to be when bought, Wieler v. Schilizzi, 17 C. B. 619
(Eng. 1856) ; but if sold as goods of a particular brand they must be salable as of that brand,
McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., 274 Fed. 397 (D. S. D. N. Y. 1921). The
fact of merchantability is to be decided by the jury, Raymond Syndicate, Inc. v. American
Radio & Research Corp., 236 Mass. 147, i6o N. E. 821 (1928).
'Mechem, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Goods (927) II MINN. L. REv. 485.
'Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868) ; BENJAMIN, SALES (6th ed. 1920) 715; I WuLISTON, SALES (2d ed. i92o) § 235; Mechem, ibid, at 488.
"Gardner v. Gray, 4 Campb. 144 (1815) ; Laing v. Fidgeon, 4 Campb. 69 (i815) ; Jones
v. Just, ibid. at 202; 1 WILLISTON, SALES 236; Mechem, op. cit. supra note 2, at 489.
'Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg. Co., 174 Cal. 799, 164 Pac. 792 (i917); Oil-Well Supply
Co. v. Watson, 168 Ind. 603, 8o N. E. 157 (i9o7) ; Kaull v. Blacker, io7 Kan. 578, 193 Pac.
182 (1920) ; Flaherty v. Maine Motor Co., 117 Me. 376, IO4 Atl. 627 (I918) (prior to adoption of Sales Act) ; Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., I6 Mass. 440, 82 N. E. 682 (I9O7) (prior to
adoption of Sales Act) ; Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926); Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. New State Shirt & Overall Mfg. Co., 42 Okla. 554, 141 Pac. iirr
(914) ; G. M. C. Truck Co. v. Kelly, 105 Okla. 84, 231 Pac. 882 (924); Detroit Automatic
Scale Co. v. Smith Co., 217 S. W. 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Gorby v. Bridgman, 83 W.
Va. 727, 99 S. E. 88 (1919) ; Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, suqro note 2; cf. Stuart v.
Burlington County Farmers Exchange, 90 N. J. L. 584, 1oi At. 265 (1917) ; Olson v. SulliContrar: Crow v. Fones Bros., 176 Ark. 993, 4 S.
van, iog Okla. 297, 234 Pac. 634 (925).
W. (2d) 904 (1928) ; Fuchs & Lang Mfg. Co. v. Kittredge & Co., 242 Ill. 88, 89 N. E. 723
(19o9) (before adoption of Sales Act) ; Ivans v. Laury, 67 N. J. L. 153, 5o Atl. 355 (19o9)
(before adoption of Sales Act).
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Section 15 (4) of the Act 0 makes no mention of "known, described, and
definite" articles, but merely denies an implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose where there is a sale of a specified article under its "patent or
other trade name". The meaning of the term "patent name" is obviously
indisputable but difficulty has arisen as to when an article acquires a trade
name.7 In Bristol Tramways & CarriageCo., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Ltd.," decided
in 19IO, it was held that the name "Fiat" was not sufficiently associated in

the public mind with a particular model of automobile to be considered a trade
name, the automobile industry then being in a formative stage. The American
cases hold that the term "trade name" applies only to goods known in the market
by that description, and that the name must have some standing in point of time.9
Professor Williston states 10 that it means a known, described, and definite
article. But a generic or general name, where each manufacturer has a separate
additional name for his particular brand, is not a trade name. 1' In the case of
a sale under such a generic name, the courts have enforced an implied warranty of
merchantable quality.1 2 But it would seem that when the goods sold under a
generic name do not meet the description, the ratio decidendi should be not a mere
breach of a warranty of merchantability but a breach of the contract itself.' 3
It is not sufficient under § 15 (4) that the sale be of goods having a patent
or trade name. For this subsection to apply the sale must be under a patent
or trade name. 14 Where the goods are described in the contract by a patent or
trade name, the seller has no opportunity to exercise his skill or judgment as to
its fitness for the particular purpose of the buyer, and hence § 15 (4) will exclude
'Subsections (I), (2), and (4) of § 15 of the Uniform Sales Act are relevant:
"(I) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the par-

ticular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the

seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not) there is an

implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description .from a seller who deals in goods of
that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or
trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose."
7Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors, Ltd., supra note I, at 839; Baldry v. Marshall, [i925] 1 K. B. 26o. This case also suggests that a trade name may not be
by goods of such elaborate description as an automobile.
acquired
9
Supra note I, at 839.
Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co. v. Rodd, 22o Fed. 750 (C. C. A. 6th, 19r5) ; Barrett Co.
v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 Fed. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928) ; American Mine Equipment Co. v. Butler Consolidated Coal Co., 41 Fed. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 3d, i93o) ; Stroock &
Co. v. Lichtenthal, 224 App. Div. 39, 229 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1928). In Laughman's Appeal,
i28 Pa. 1 (1889), it was held that a "trade name" is a name used to indicate the personal
origin or source of the article to which it is applied, and thus to identify such article and distinguish it in the market from other articles of a similar name.
" i WIiasTox, op. cit. supra note 3, § 236.
"Burgner-Bowman Lumber Co. v. McKord-Kistler Mercantile Co., 114 Kan. io, 216
Pac. 815 (923) (Portland Cement) ; Griffin v. Metal Products Co., 264 Pa. 254, io7 Atl.
713 (1919) (high-speed steel) ; cf. Birdsong Bros. v. Slayton Co., 79 N. H. 364, Io9 Atd. 146
(ig2o) (No. I quality Bayo beans).
2 Thompson v. Colorado Portland Cement Co., 64 Colo. 156, 170 Pac. 949 (i918) (Portland Cement); De Loach Mill Mfg. Co. v. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co., 2 Ga. App.
493, 58 S. E. 79o (9o7) (Alabama iron No. I soft) ; Sampson v. Pels & Co., igg App. Div.
854, 192 N. Y. Supp. 538 (922) (combed Sea Island cotton) ; Operators Fuel Agency v.
Eastern Fuel Co., 83 Pa. Super. 598 (1924) (Classified Pool 6o Coal), Josling v. Kingsford,
13 C. B. N. S. 447 (Eng. 1863) (oxalic acid); Frith v. Mitchell, 4 Fost. & F. 464 (Eng.
i865).
Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399 (Eng. 1838) ; BENJAMIN, SALEs 695.
4 WASH.
14 Gore, Implied Warranties of Quality under the Uniform Sales Act (929)
L. Rmv. I5.

NOTES

an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose.1 5 But where the purchaser notifies the seller of the particular purpose for which he desires the goods,
and relies on his judgment to supply something adapted to that end, the seller
does not escape liability by recommending and subsequently selling an article
bearing a trade name.1 6 This has been well stated by Atkin, L. J., in Baldry v.
Marshall: 17
"When the proviso speaks of 'the sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name' it means an article specified by the purchaser as
being the article which he wishes to buy. If he so specifies the article and it
is sold to him under its trade name it seems clear that the condition [of fitness] is excluded, even though he made known to the seller the purpose
for which he intended to use it. But if on the other hand he buys the
article in reliance on the seller's assurance that it will answer his purpose,
the fact that it is described in the contract by its trade name will not have
the effect of excluding the condition."
Does an implied warranty of merchantable quality accompany a sale of goods
under a patent or trade name? Section 15 (4), it is stated, codifies the common
law denying an implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose in the sale
of known, described, and definite articles.18 The two subsections applying to an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose are (i) and (4), and these
are combined in one subsection in the English Sale of Goods Act, 19 which the
Uniform Sales Act purported to follow. 20 It is now well settled that subsection
The aphorism veritas
(i).21
(4) is an express limitation engrafted on subsection
22
demonstrationis tollit errorem nowinis applies.
It has also been held that subsection (4) is an express limitation on subsection
(2). Thus the act denies not only an implied warranty of fitness for any par'Matteson v. Lagace, 36 R. 1. 223, 89 Atl. 713 (914) ; Aetna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding
etc. Co., 98 Vt. 51, 126 At. 582 (1924). For numerous decisions which have so interpreted
§ 15 (4) see i UmFo
LAWS ANNOrATED (1922) 131 et seq.
"Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 12o N. E. 225 (x918) ; Ireland

v. Liggett Co., 243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371 (1923) ; Weiner v. Schulte, Inc., 176 N. E. 114,
(Mass. 1931) ; Sachter v. Gulf Refining Co., 203 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1923) ; Foley v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N. Y. Supp. 233 (193o) ; Long v. The Five
Hundred Co., 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923) ; Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., Ig5

Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929) ; Baldry v. Marshall, [1924] I K. B. 26o. In Weiner v.
Schulte, Inc., plaintiff wishing to buy chewing tobacco, requested a certain brand of defend-

ant's clerk. He was told they had none of that brand in stock, but defendant's clerk recommended a brand which he did have. Plaintiff purchased it and was subsequently injured by
a nail therein. Recovery was allowed under § I (1). The court, speaking through Field, J.,
said: "It does not follow necessarily from the fact that the article purchased had a trade

name that it was purchased thereunder or that the buyer did not rely on the skill or judgment
of the seller. . . . The existence of an implied warranty 'is not negatived where the purchaser of an article for a definite purpose rather than of a particular kind of merchandise,
relies on the seller to supply him with something adapted to that end; the latter *in that case
does not escape liability by the recommendation and subsequent sale of an article having a
trade name'." The latter quotation by the court is from Ireland v. Liggett Co., supra.
1 Supra note 7, at 268.
'Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. Kronauer & Co., 228 Ill. App. 236 (923) ; Dunn
Co. v. Charlevoix Co., 247 Mich. 398, 225 N. W. 592 (1929) ; Empire Cream Separator Co. v.
Quinn, 184 App. Div. 3o2, 171 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1918) ; Bristol Tramways & Carriage Co.,
Ltd. v. Fiat Motors, Ltd., supra note i, at 836; 1 WLLIsT N, op. cit. supra note 3, § 236.
"56 & 57 VICT. c. 71 § 14 (1) (1893).
"1 WImLISToN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 248.
21 Matteson v. Lagace, supra note 15, at

Spaulding etc. Co., supra note

I5, at 59, 126
see i UNIFORM LAvs ANNOTATED I30 et seq.

'Rex
725.

226,

89 Atl. at 714; Aetna Chemical Co. v.

Atl. at 585. For additional citations in accord

v. Bishop of Chester, i Ld. Raym. 303 (1693); BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 3,
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ticular purpose, but also an implied warranty of merchantable quality in the sale
of goods under a patent or trade name.28 In Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v.
Kronauer & Co.,24 the defendant company ordered one hundred rolls of "B. B.
Harness leather" from the plaintiff company, this being a brand which had been
known by this name for many years. The defect was one of merchantability.
The court held for the plaintiff under the following reasoning: that as a matter
of law this was a trade name sale; that § 15 (1) does not apply to such a sale
because the defendant did not rely on the vendor's skill or judgment, nor did
the defendant make known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods were required; that § 15 (2) does not apply since § 15 clearly distinguishes
between a sale by description and one by trade name; and since § 15 (4)is the
only section that applies, and there is no implied warranty of fitness thereunder,
the defense must fail.
A similar holding, by implication, is reached by courts which, on the authority of § 15 (4), deny an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
where the sale was of goods under a patent or trade name, the courts giving no
consideration to an implied warranty of merchantability. 5 One such case is
Stoehrer & PrattDodgem Corporationv. Greenburg.2 There the defendant purchased of the plaintiff company a patented amusement device known as the
"Dodgem", which proved defective because of faulty construction. The court
held that the evidence offered by the defendant to prove the device defective
was inadmissable, since under § 15 (4)there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose. The court did not entertain the thought that
an implied warranty of merchantability might be upheld even though it was a
sale under a patent name.
The results reached by these cases may be caused by judicial confusion as
to the meaning of the phrase "fitness for a particular purpose", since § 15 (4)
clearly restricts itself to such an implied warranty.2 7 In many cases fitness for a
particular purpose may be the same as fitness for the general purpose, that is,
merchantability. 28 Particularly is this so in the case of food since both its fitness
for a particular purpose and its merchantable quality are satisfied by its fitness
for human consumption. 29 But the two differ where the special purpose of the
buyer will not be satisfied by mere fitness for general purposes.,0 Whether it be
Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. Kronauer & Co., supra note I8.
Cream Separator Co. v. Quinn, supra note 18, at 306, 171 N. Y. Supp. at 416.

See Empire

Ibid. at 244 et seq.

& Co. v. Pancreon Mfg. Corp., 22 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. Isi, 1927) ; Braden
v. Mountain Iron & Supply CO., 32 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; May Oil Burner Corp.
ZAtteaux

v. Munger, 159 Md. 6o5, 152 Ati. 352 (193o) ; Stoehrer & Pratt Dodgem Corp. v. Greenburg,
250 Mass. 550, 146 N. E. 34 (925) ; Bareham v. Kane, 228 App. Div. 396, 24o N. Y. Supp.
123 (1930) ; cf. Keisten v. West Coast Roofing Co., 204 Ill. App. 447 (1917) ; Lasher v. La

Berge, 125 Me. 475, 135 Atl. 31 (1926) ; Ohio Electric Co. v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light &
Power Co., 161 Wis. 632, 155 N. IV.

112

(1915) ; Russell Co. v. Budden, i97 Wis. 615,

222

N. W. 788 (1929). With respect to holdings in cases which have not adopted the Sales Act,
cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jerry, 181 Ark. 771, 27 S. W. (2d) 997 (1930);
Illinois Zinc Co. v. Semple, 123 Kans. 368, 225 Pac. 78 (927).

Ibid.
This was suggested in (925)

23 Mica. L. REv. 8o5.

- American Tank. Co. v. Revert Oil Co., supra note I, at 694, 196 Pac. at 1113; Keenan
v. Cherry & Webb, 47 R. I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925) ; Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, supra
note 1, at 433, 111 S. E. at 151.

I WniusoN, op. cit. supra notes 3, § 235.

In American

Tank Co. v. Revert Oil Co., a 16oo bbl. oil tank was sold. It was held that it was designed
for the purpose of holding i6oo bbl. of oil and unless it could do so, it was unmerchantable.
I Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc.. supra note i6, at 475, 241 N. Y. Supp. at
241. BENIAmiN, op. cit. supra note 3, 715.
' Seitz v. Brewers Refrigerating Co., 141 U. S. 510 (189I) ; Dunbar Bros. Co. v. Con-

solidated Iron-Steel Mfg. Co., 23 Fed. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; Ryan v. Progressive
Stores Co., 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931).

In the latter case, the court, speaking

NOTES

this or some other reason which caused these courts 31 not to consider an implied
warranty of merchantable quality in a sale of goods under a patent or trade
name, the propriety of such decisions may well be doubted.
This difficulty which the courts have experienced in permitting an implied
warranty of merchantable quality in a patent or trade name sale may be concluded by a reasonable construction of § 15. " Under this view § 15 (1) is of
general application, in effect providing that no matter how the goods are sold,
where a buyer expressly or impliedly makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which he purchases the goods, and the buyer relies on the skill or
judgment of the seller, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose. Standing alone, such a proviso is sufficiently
broad to' include patent or trade name sales. Similarly § 15 (2) is of general
application, providing in effect that, regardless of the method of description,
where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable
quality. Just as in § I5 (1), this subsection is sufficient general to embody a
sale of goods under a patent or trade name where such a sale is by description.
As opposed to these two general provisions is § 15 (4), which is expressly specific. Under this subsection, in the case of a contract to sell or a sale of specified
goods under a patent or trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness
for any particular purpose. Thus subsection (4) is a limitation on the general
provision in subsection (i), but has no limiting effect whatsoever on subsection (2)Y3
To determine whether a sale by patent or trade name may be a sale by
description within the meaning of subsection (2), a sale by description must be
defined. Professor Williston says 3 4 that the phrase should be limited to cases
where the identification of the goods which are the subject-matter of the contract
depends upon the description, and this view has been judicially approved 5
There seems to be no reason why a sale by patent or trade name should not constitute a sale by description. "
Just as there are few decisions expressly denying this distinction, 7 there are
few expressly recognizing it. In Bristol Tramways & CarriageCo., Ltd. v. Fiat
Motors, Ltd.,38 Farwell, L. J., said:
through Cardozo, C. J., said: "There are times when a warranty of fitness has no relation
to a warranty of merchantable quality. This is so, for example, when machinery, completely wrought, is still inadequate for the use to which the buyer has given notice that it is
likely to be applied. There are times, on the other hand, when the warranties co-exist in
which event a recovery may be founded upon either."
ISupra notes 23 and 25.

'This construction of the pertinent sections of § I5 is taken from Mechem, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 492.
' This construction is strengthened by the form of the English Sale of Goods Act, in
which the substance of our subsections (I) and (4) is combined into subsection (I) of § 14,
thus showing a clear intent for subsection (4) to qualify subsection (I).
I WILUSTON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 224.

= Maggioros v. Edson, 164 N. Y. Supp. 377 (1917) ; American Soda Fountain Co. v.
Medford Grocery Co., 128 Ore. 83, 262 Pac. 939 (1928). In Wren v. Holt, [19o3]
K. B.
61o, Vaughan Williams, L. J., stated that a sale of goods over the counter was not a sale by
description, but this was disapproved by the court in Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, [1928] 2 K.
B. 636.
=McNeil & Higgins Co. v. Czarnikow-Rienda Co., supra note I, at 399; Gore, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 23; Mechem, op. cit.'supra note 2, at 492; I WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note
3, § 243.
s Supra note 23.
1 [19io] 2 Y B. 831.
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"The implied condition that the goods are of merchantable quality
applies to all goods bought from a seller who deals in goods of that description whether they are sold under a patent or trade name or otherwise."
In two other English cases, Wren v. Holt39 and Morelli v. Fitch and Gibbons,"0 involving somewhat similar factual situations,4L the courts held that the
sale of a beverage which the plaintiff ordered under a brand name, constituted
a sale by description. These cases reach the desirable conclusion, but in doing
so seem to deny, by implication, that it was a trade name sale. It is submitted
that it would have been technically more correct to have held the sale one under
a trade name-a sale under a trade name being one by description within the
purview of subsection (2).

Similar to Wren v. Holt and Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, are several American cases which on their factual make-ups, reveal a sale under patent or trade
name. 42 These courts make no mention of a trade name sale, but hold the sales to
be by description, thus permitting an implied warranty of merchantable quality
under § 15 (2). It is possible that these courts, also, were motivated by the
thought that to admit these sales to be under trade name would preclude an
implied warranty of merchantable quality."3
In Sturm v. Williams Oven Mfg. Co., 4 the court held a sale of a "No. 40
oven without piping" not to be a trade name sale, but a sale by description, and so
upheld an implied warranty of merchantable quality under § 15 (2). The court
could have held this a trade name sale and still have enforced an implied warranty
of merchantability against the seller without resorting to such legal prestidigitation.
I
In a recent Massachusetts case 45 a new principle was enunciated, namely,
that there is an implied warranty of the merchantable quality of goods according
to the trade name, when the seller knows the buyer is purchasing them for the
purposes of resale. The raison d'etre of such a view may well be doubted, since
*' [19o3] i K. B. 61o.
[1928] 2 K. B. 636.

"In Wren v. Holt plaintiff ordered beer by its trade name in defendant's beerhouse. He
was made ill by arsenic which the beer contained. In Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, plaintiff
ordered a bottle of "Stone's at two and nine". While attempting to open it, the bottle broke
at the neck, it being defective. Accord: Sumnerf Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co., [2922] 1
K. B. 55. There defendant sold tonic water to the plaintiff under the name of "Webb's
Indian Tonic" to be shipped to the Argentine. Import was refused there under a statute
because the tonic contained salicyclic acid. Recovery was denied plaintiff. It was held that
this was a sale by description under subsection (2) and there is therefore an implied warranty of merchantable quality. Here the article delivered was of merchantable quality.
Robinson v. Barteldes Seed Co., 139 Md. 486, 115 Atl. 757 (1921) (Stowell's evergreen); Patterson Foundry & Machine Co. v. Detroit Stove Works, 23o Mich. 518, 202 N.
W. 957 (1925) (type C porcelain lined wet grinding mills) ; Peerless Electric Co. v. Call, 82
Pa. Super. 55o (924)
(Universal Motor driven fan) ; cf. London Guarantee etc. Co., Ltd.
v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S. W. (2d) 766 (1929) (Sales Act not adopted). For
a case holding not a trade name sale but allowing recovery under § iS (I), and not § 15 (2),
see Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 16 (Grandmother's Brand A. &
P. Beans & Pork with Sauce); cf. Hausmann v. Pollard, 223 Minn. 429, 129 N. W. 848
(1911) (Hausmann separator steering device) ; Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., '36 App. Div. 22, I2o N. Y. Supp. 263 (2909) (Barber Asphalt Blocks). Although no implied warranty of fitness for any particular purpose in a sale of goods under a
trade name, the defendant might be held liable for negligence in its selection of the article
delivered. Herbert v. Mahon Co., 211 Ill. App. 297 (2928).
"See supra, discussion of Wren v. Holt and Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons; Mechem, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 492; Gore, op. cit. supra note 24, at 23.
"201 App. Div. 113, 193 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1922).
' Snelling v. Dine, 270 Mass. 50, 17o N. E. 403 (I93O) ; cf. Parker v. Shaghalian Co.,
supra note 2.

NO TES
it penalizes one who purchases goods under a trade name for purposes other than
resale.
The genesis of the distinction sought to be made here has been expressly
recognized in a brilliant opinion by Learned Hand, J., in McNeil & Higgins Co. v.
Czarnikow-Rienda Co. 46 In that case the plaintiff company ordered of the
defendant company five thousand bags of sugar, specifying a particular brand.
The sugar delivered was not up to the quality of such brand. Quoting from
Justice Hand:
"The case can be tested by the supposed sale of a manufacturer. Assume that, having a reputation distinguished by his brand, he agrees to sell
under that brand. Presumably the brand means some uniform quality,
which has made it known and desired. The buyer exacts it because he
expects the delivery to have that quality. The seller knows of the buyer's
expectations, and he is in a position to know whether the delivery conforms
with those expectations. He knows that the buyer relies on his better knowledge to insure their realization. He cannot suppose that the buyer cares for
the fact that he makes the goods independently of the quality of which that
fact assures him. If he is charged with more than a literal compliance with
any part of the description because of his better information, he ought, I
should say, be charged with this. If not, it can only be because the brand
is taken as signifying nothing in the quality of the goods, an erroneous
understanding of the parties' meaning.

.

.

. Where the buyer specifies

what he wants, he can, of course, not rely upon any superior knowledge
of the seller that it will serve his purposes. If he did, he must give the seller
some latitude of selection. But he may still insist that it must be of a quality
which will pass in the market under that description, and he may rightly rely
upon the seller to secure him such a quality."
The last three sentences of this passage were quoted with approval by Chief
judge Cardozo in a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals,4 which is
in accord with the holding in the McNeil case. Raymond Syndicate, Inc. v. American Radio & Research Corporation4 s expresses a similar view. In that case
radios were sold under a trade name, and it was held that there was no implied
warranty as to fitness for any particular purpose, but that there was an implied
warranty of merchantable quality according to its49 trade name. The principle
here advocated is also sustained by various dicta.
The most cogent reasons require the adoption of the judicial mechanism
herein suggested for the adjudication of future cases. The enforcement of an
" Supra note i.
Ryan v. Progressive Stores Co.. supra note 30. In this case plaintiff's wife purchased
a loaf of bread in defendant's store, specifying "Ward's bread". Defendlant's clerk gave her
the loaf, wrapped in the sealed package in which it had come from the baker. Plaintiff was
injured by a pin which was concealed within the loaf. Held, recovery for the plaintiff under
§ I5 (2). However somewhat like the decisions in Wren v. Holt and Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons, the court failed to distinguish between a sale by description and a trade name sale which
is a sale by description.
IsSupra note i.
19Bencoe Exporting & Importing Co., Inc. v. McGraw Tire & Rubber Co., 212 App. Div.
r36, 2o8 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1925) ; Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., supra note i6,
at 472, 241 N. Y. Supp. at 238 (approving the last three sentences of the quotation from
Learned Hand, J., in the McNeil case); cf. Parker v. Shaghalian Co., supra note i; Polly
v. Arony, 172 N. Y. Supp. 3o5 (1gi8).
In the Bencoe case the court said: "The plaintiff
asserts that subdivision (4) is not applicable but, assuming it to be applicable, defendant's
position is untenable; since goods sold under a trade name must be at least as merchantable
as the general run of such goods."
'a
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implied warranty of merchantable quality in the sale of specified goods under a
patent or trade name, is not only legally, but socially, desirable, since it does not
increase the obligations of a reputable vendor and.provides the purchaser with
a reasonable safeguard against sharp practice. The legal mandate to sell merchantable goods, even when ordered by a patent or trade name, should be one of
the burdens of doing business.50 'Without this protection to the buyer, every
vendor would attach a trade name to his product, which would result in the necessity of the courts' defending the purchaser by judicial legerdemain of some sort.
S.A.B.
Cardozo, C. J., in Ryan v. Progressive Stores Co., supra note 30, at 392.

